Political scientists Ola Dahlman (Sweden), Svein Mykkeltveit (Norway) and Hein Haak (the Netherlands) have written an unusual paper. On the face of it, it is a solid reference edition concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), International Nuclear Explosion Monitoring System (IMS) and Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization. In point of fact, the authors produced a multilayered book in which one can distinguish several conceptual layers.
Layer one: an attempt to present the subject of nuclear test ban as a diplomatic domain. The technical literature on the subject of nuclear tests written by military professionals or physics scientists is quite extensive. There is a publication of international relations scientists concerning the terms of the CTBT, attitude of some or other state thereto and prospects for that treaty coming (or not coming) into effect. However, neither Russian, nor foreign political science has so far published any paper narrating the nuclear test topics in the international relations. An attempt to resolve that problem was made by the authors of the book under review.
Layer two: a broad use of natural science information. Operating principles of nuclear explosion monitoring stations. Physical nature of earthquakes, hydroacoustics, propagation of radioactive isotopes and volcanic activity. Differences between the electronic simulation of nuclear explosions and physical nuclear tests. Structure of subcritical and hydronuclear tests and their detectability… Such amount of technical information makes the book hard to perceive for any lay person. Nevertheless, the authors take technical problems to the political level thus giving them a different twist. Only after getting acquainted with the natural science part of the monograph, the reader begins to understand why the long-suffering CTBT is still inactive1.
Layer three: a significant subtext. It is hard to tell whether it appeared in the paper through or notwithstanding the intentions of the authors. The book is written in the scientific language and is destined to provide deep insight into the issues raised. However, the text is supplied with a lot of photographs, maps and diagrams provided by the Nuclear Weapons Archives (USA), the Nevada Test Site Agency (USA) and the Preparatory Committee of the CTBT Organization (Austria). While comparing these illustrations with the text, one can sometimes look at the authors’ speculations in a different way. Set phrases acquire a new meaning revealing challenging diplomatic problems.
Layer four: semi-official nature of the paper. The foreword to the book was written by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden Karl Bildt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway Jonas Gahr Store and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Maxim Verhagen. Having called the monograph a “brilliant review” of the CTBT and IMS (p. V), they highlighted a number of most important provisions. Firstly, that the book contains lessons for future arms control talks. Secondly, that the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is today one of the key challenges to the international security. Thirdly, that their respective countries endorse the idea of building a “nuclear-free world.” Studying of the CTBT problems turns into an ideological and theoretical foundation for the idea of “global nuclear disarmament.”
In this regard, the “Nuclear Test Ban” fits well into the discussion about the opportunities for transition to “a nuclear-free world.” Way back in 2007, the USA saw an “initiative of four,” a call of Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn to enter into negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In 2008, the vocal support of “a nuclear-free world” in the USA, Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands was already heard at the official level. In his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, US President Barack Obama brought nuclear disarmament issues to the level of Washington’s foreign policy priorities. The President of the United States described the problem of ratification of the CTBT and general abandonment of nuclear tests as one of its tasks.
There is another aspect to the problem. Traditionally, the Nordic countries were the ones who acted as mediators in negotiating the arms control. Since the cold war, Helsinki, Stockholm and Reykjavik became symbols of Soviet (Russian)-American arms control meetings. The “North Europeans” themselves saw in these talks a path to raising their status in international relations. It was in Oslo where an international conference on the problems of global nuclear disarmament was held on February 26, 2008, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Next item on the agenda is revitalization of the talks (supposedly, through the intermediary of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands) on a revival of the CTBT.
In the introduction to the paper, the researchers gave a new perspective to studying the CTBT. In the eyes of the authors, its functions are wider than the link between the non-proliferation and arms control problems. According to them, the treaty is called to let down the bars on the way of further arms control talks (p. VII). At the same time, that paper personifies a new, transnational, concept of security (p. IX). The structure of the book is designed to make good that thesis.
The first section is dedicated to the history of nuclear tests. The authors review programs of real nuclear explosions in the USA, USSR, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and DPRK. (Since 1962, the British nuclear test program has been carried out in collaboration with the USA.) According to O. Dahlman, S. Mykkeltveit and H. Haak, real nuclear tests in the 1940s–1960s were necessary for the development of nuclear weapons. They offered the possibility:
– to confirm the possibility of making a nuclear explosive device,
– to study physical characteristics of nuclear explosions, including radioactive contamination,
– to improve the structure of nuclear warheads,
– to verify the readiness condition of new systems,
– to get a notion of the nuclear yield and mass of nuclear warheads,
– to improve systems for mounting nuclear warheads on delivery vehicles,
– to study the nuclear explosion side effects on a combat,
– to gain political advantages from demonstrating reliability of their nuclear weapons (p. 9).
In the 1970s, the technological progress (especially development of electronic simulation of nuclear explosions) mitigated the need for carrying out real nuclear tests. This enabled nuclear powers to sign the CTBT in 1996. Nowadays the destiny of the treaty depends on completion of three military engineering tasks: (1) maintenance of nuclear warheads at depots in the combat-ready condition, (2) transfer of old nuclear warhead components into new ones, and (3) making of new warheads based on strictly theoretical modeling simulation of nuclear weapons (p. 11). The speculative nature of the above-listed problems is the cheval de bataille of the opponents of the CTBT ratification in the USA and China, as well as proponents of withdrawal from it in France and the Russian Federation.
The authors believe that what lay at the root of the CTBT was good will of great powers, rather than an aspiration to gain one-sided military and technological advantages. The paper mentions that the electronic simulation of nuclear explosions does not replace real nuclear tests: they only give an idea of the design, rather than of the nuclear yield and mass of nuclear warheads (p. 9). It is more important that the CTBT postulates an advance towards nuclear disarmament, strengthening of international peace and security, as well as blocks up the possibility of development of novel types of nuclear systems (p. 14).
At this point, deliberations of O. Dahlman, S. Mykkeltveit and H. Haak could have received an interesting twist. Way back in 1977–1980, the USSR, USA and Britain held “tripartite negotiations” on a CTBT. At that time, a lot of opponents of the idea of nuclear test ban emerged among Soviet military experts2. They took up the position that Washington is ahead of Moscow in the development of computer-aided nuclear explosion simulation systems. Another point of view was that Soviet nuclear warheads more often than American required renewal of fissionable materials. Judiciary American experts placed an emphasis on the USSR’s and France’s superiority in the technologies of uranium enrichment and separation of plutonium from nuclear fuel. It may be so that just because of the arguments of skeptics, and not in the least due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the “tripartite negotiations” became stymied in 1980, and nuclear powers resumed their tests.
However, the “tripartite negotiations” in the book under review occupy a mere one paragraph (p. 63). In the meantime, it would be interesting to review arguments of the CTBT opponents that appeared at that moment (and have been repeated to the present day). Otherwise, the authors’ thesis about the inequality between the electronic simulation of explosions and real nuclear tests will force the CTBT discussions to “go round again.” For the CTBT backers, that fact refutes an opinion that some powers will gain advantages from the treaty. To opponents of the treaty it proves that the CTBT poses a “threat” to the preservation of nuclear arsenals. It appears as if conceptually the present-day discussions about the CTBT ratification continue at the level of the 1970s.
The second section is dedicated to the problems of technical support of the IMS. Researchers point out that nuclear tests leave behind emissions of radioactive elements (p. 25). That is why the IMS includes several types of observation stations. Seismic observation stations should distinguish between underground nuclear bursts and earthquakes and volcanic explosions. Hydroacoustic stations should detect specific acoustic signals in the oceans. Infrared stations should detect discharges of radioactive particles into the atmosphere. Radionuclide stations are engaged in similar activities. A prospective line appears to be space-based observations: detection of underground nuclear test sites by way of capturing electromagnetic pulses. Numerous graphs and photos confirm the credibility of such monitoring.
Yet, on page 46, the authors give an interesting photograph of an outburst of a Peruvian volcano. Its caption says that “not all mushroom clouds are of nuclear origin.” This brings up a disturbing question, “What if one state will want to indict another state of carrying out nuclear tests?” Whether one can succeed in passing off a volcanic explosion as a nuclear explosion is a specific question. For all that, after the IMS started to work, any volcanic eruption began to acquire political connotation. An alarming remark if one recalls that, for example, the entire water area of the Pacific Ocean (where there is quite a number of threshold states) is encircled with a range of above-ground and submarine volcanoes.
This observation invites yet another question: is it possible to use the IMS technologies for double purposes? The authors give no clear answer thereto. Throughout the text turn up notes of “hydroacoustic noise variation with changing weather conditions” (p. 28), a “global grid” of seismic stations (p. 31), scaled up monitoring of non-nuclear chemical explosions of 300 tons of explosives or greater (p. 34), monitoring of the flow of gases in the atmosphere (p. 45). This strengthens suspicions that some segments of the IMS can be used for different objects. Of even greater interest are the authors’ speculations about the possible cooperation with the International Seismological Center of the European-Mediterranean Seismological Center, US Air Force Technical Support Center, Japan Meteorological Agency (p.40). It looks like the authors deliberately omitted the whole block of information about the IMS in their book.
The third section is dedicated to the history of the CTBT. Dahlman, Mykkeltveit and Haak show the inception of the idea of nuclear test ban. “Baruch Plan.” Soviet and Indian initiatives of the 1950s. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water (1963) and Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974). The “tripartite negotiations” of the late 1970s and the work of international expert groups modeling monitoring of nuclear explosions. Opening of Geneva negotiations in January 1994 and reaching of an agreement on “zero energy”3. Terms and conditions of the CTBT and topical issues at the negotiations. New York meeting in November 1996 and signing of an agreement on the IMS operating principles. All that gives the reader a holistic view of the diplomatic struggle for the nuclear test ban.
However, the authors left out of their paper analysis of fierce political debates about the CTBT. Was the Threshold Test Ban Treaty dictated by the USSR’s and USA’s wish to go along the road of “nuclear disarmament”, or Moscow and Washington merely agreed to commence transition from liquid-propellant to solid-propellant ballistic missiles4? What results were obtained at the “tripartite negotiations,” and were the follow-up activities of the international study groups connected with them? Why the “zero energy” arrangements reached at the New York meeting of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton on October 23, 1995, were interpreted by the republicans as an “unjustified concession” to Moscow? Why Russia and China made a stand against accelerated construction of the IMS in 1997? These questions remained outside of the monograph under review. Maybe, the authors merely chose to steer clear of sensitive issues. But, maybe, their silence conveys a subtle political hint: so much of classified information in this, seemingly, open topic!
The fourth section is dedicated to the matters of the IMS functioning. Lengthy (sometimes over-elaborated) technical deliberations of the authors conceal several important problems. First of all, the authors show that the negotiations on the implementation of the IMS were arduous and long. Secondly, researchers give a functional diagram of the IMS which includes a space component, a Global Communication Infrastructure. Thirdly, the point whether this system can be used for other purposes still remains unclear. (For example, to monitor operation of nuclear power plants or launches of ballistic missile.) However, even this vague information is sufficient to understand: earnest diplomatic battles about the IMS in the mid-1990s did take place. Whether they are over at present is an open question. Yet, the reader has a subject for contemplation.
Even more interesting information can be derived from the map of geographical localization of the IMS given on page 115. Several regions with the highest concentration of observation stations strike the eye. Scandinavian countries. Central Europe. The European part of Russia. North-East Asia. Pacific coast of the USA. Pacific coast of the Latin America. Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific islands. Water area of the Atlantic Ocean. Antarctic coast. Thus, the key areas of the IMS are not near the borders of “rogue states”, but on the line of monitoring nuclear test sites of the “old” nuclear powers. Moreover, most of the observation stations are in the territory of the USA or their allies. What is the real purpose of the IMS, and is it possible to bespeak the equality of its participants?
The fifth section is of reference nature. The authors go into the matters of functioning of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization, International Data Center of the IMS, Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission. Special attention is given to their budgeting principles. The authors see the central problem in the fight between the members of the Commission for the allocation of funds and in the underfinancing of the IMS (p. 229–232). At the same time, they underline the need to enhance cooperation between the Preparatory Committee and the scientific community for the development of new methods of detection of nuclear tests.
The section about the problems of the CTBT integration into the new agenda of the international security appears as an analogy of a conceptual conclusion (p. 235–236). The authors gear the upcoming trends in the nuclear test diplomacy to the “transnational challenges”: from prevention of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists to implementation of a system of really global observations. Such conclusion suggests that discussions about the nuclear test ban may receive a totally new focus. Let us imagine that under the pretence of antiterrorist protection the nuclear powers would be recommended to abandon subcritical “zero energy” tests. Can this lead to the break-up of the nuclear test ban regime?
At the beginning of their paper, O. Dahlman, S. Mykkeltveit and H. Haak set forth their vision of the non-proliferation philosophy. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was, in their opinion, designed to preserve a status quo in the nuclear sphere. Other arrangements – from numerous treaties establishing “nuclear-free zones” to the Open-Skies Treaty – also served this task. However, as judged by the authors’ observation, the CTBT changes this status quo. Its hypothetic entry into force may place legitimate nuclear powers on an unequal footing. This, in its turn, can lead to a revision of the non-proliferation system. (It will be remembered that India motivated its nuclear tests in 1998 by the response to the “discriminatory” conditions of the CTBT!).
Some interesting parallels arise with the Soviet political literature of the Brezhnev era. In the 1970s, a peculiar genre formed within it: to put the reader up to the last word of the Western thought under the guise of criticism of “bourgeois concepts.” A similar trait is present in the “Nuclear Test Ban”. While advocating “the progressive character of the CTBT,” the authors, through half-words and photographs, show how many hidden traps there are in this subject. It seems that over the past twenty years a framework of “progressive” problems formed in the EU countries and USA – from ecology and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons to the global civil society – about which researchers are not recommended to be skeptic. This is not censorship yet. But the fear of public opinion resembles it ever more.
Alexey Fenenko,
PhD (History)
Notes
1 The CTBT was open for signature on September 24, 1996. For its coming into effect, it is required that it is ratified by at least one third of signatory states who possess closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
2 Ref.: Nuclear Tests of the USSR / Under the editorship of V.N. Mikhailova. M.: IZDAT, 1997; K. Nikolayev. Nuclear Deterrence: Past and Future. M.: IMEMO of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1989.
3 The “zero energy” is a principle in accordance with which it is allowed to carry out low-yield subcritical and hydronuclear tests, provided that no energy is released during the tests. In 1996, Russia and the USA took it as a basis of their programs for the maintenance of safety of nuclear warheads without carrying out real nuclear tests.
4 Liquid-propellant mother missiles feature a greater throw-weight than solid-propellant missiles. It is possible that within the framework of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 the USSR and USA attempted to limit by implication the power of new, solid-propellant, nuclear delivery vehicles.
