Today the generally accepted opinion is that the global issues of the present cannot be resolved by a single, even the strongest, country in the world, or by synergetic efforts of a limited number of major countries. The prospect of global cooperation within the framework of a multipolar world is viewed by many as an imperative which can guarantee the survival of mankind on our planet. However, one has to recognize that the multipolar world is not a well-established reality, and the concept of multipolarism has not yet been developed either in the academic, or, a fortiori, practical aspect. It entails a number of quite relevant questions, and is a target of criticism both of those interested in upholding the hegemony of the sole superpower and of those countries and nations which fear to become again (as under “classic multipolarism” before the First World War) passive victims of manipulation from the “five” or “ten” of new “great powers”. The message of the article is not only the need to corroborate that the multipolar world order has no alternative, but also the need to identify common values in the multipolarism doctrine of such culturally different and distant countries as Russia and Latin American nations.
1
The idea of building a multipolar world and maintaining relations in the global system on the basis of actual diversity has been gaining importance in Russian foreign policy approximately since the mid-1990s1. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000 incorporates the provision that Russia will continue to seek formation of the multipolar system of international relations which actually reflects the multifaceted nature of the contemporary world with the diversity of its interests. It also points out that the guarantee of effectiveness and reliability of this world order is mutual consideration of national interests, and that the world order of the 21st century must be based on the mechanisms of collective decisions on the key issues, on the precedence of law (italics added. – B.M.) and wide democratization of international relations2.
Viewing the “emerging multipolarism” as one of the “fundamental tendencies of contemporary development”, the 2008 version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation stated “the growing role, due to objective factors, of multipolar diplomacy, international institutions and mechanisms in global policy and economy, as a result of growing independence of States and the need to make global development more manageable”. It also reiterated Russia’s ambition “to seek the strengthening of principles of multipolarism in international affairs, development of an architecture of international relations that would be based on the recognition by the international community of the principles of security indivisibility in the modern world and would reflect its diversity”. Besides, the establishment of a fair and democratic world order based on collective principles of resolving international issues and on the supremacy of the international law was once again delineated as the strategic guideline of foreign policy3.
Can the “emerging multipolarism” be seen as a feature of the current moment of history? Certainly, if one does not try to pass the desirable for reality. What is “multipolarism”, and why is it a fortiori better than what has been already known in history: bipolarity and unipolarity? Many professional politicians who often use this term prefer to remain hostage of mass stereotypes. Nevertheless, the designated task of Russia’s active participation in building a multipolar world demands a more in-depth analysis of the given doctrine which, like any other theory, has its advantages and weaknesses. On top of that, keeping in mind the recognition of cultural and civilization diversity of the contemporary world4, such analysis is needed in order to identify the attitude of the key world civilizations with regard to this doctrine.
So far, a comprehensive academic research of the doctrine of multipolarity has not been translated into the practical plane. Moreover, as it was correctly noticed by Tatyana Shakleina, “the advocacy of the concept of a polycentric (multipolar) world without elucidation of details of such system, its advantages and flaws both for the world in general and individual large countries in particular, without reaching consensus among the leading world countries on how the collective management can be materialized, without the recognition by all its participants of the need for concerted interaction and reasonable competition – will disallow success”5.
The idea of a multipolar world is not new. In fact, the logic of multipolarity took shape long before the First World War. The decade that immediately preceded the war was characterized by a quite fragile “balance of forces” between the great powers: Britain, Germany, France, USA, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Japan. Alexey Bogaturov points out as follows: “Multipolarity is characterized by an approximate comparability of aggregate concurrent opportunities for several world countries neither of which enjoys a distinct superiority over others. Roughly, this structure of international relations existed in Europe of the 19th century when major European countries were jealously watching each other, prohibiting individual strengthening to the degree when a united coalition of the rest would a fortiori disallow the superiority of a contender trying to pull away”6.
Despite a “nearly academic” (according to George F.Kennan) nature of the European balance of forces which owes its origin to Bismark, a single spark, a shot in Saraevo was enough to let out the long-accumulated internal differences among the participants of the system. Today, the inability of multipolarity of the early 20th century to prevent the world to drift to the nightmare of an all-out war becomes almost the key argument for the scientists, primarily American (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch. Krauthammer, R. Keohane), who see the guarantee of global security either in the “benevolent hegemonism” of the strongest participant of the system, or in the bipolar “peace responsibility sharing” by the two strongest states (K. Waltz, J. Meersheimer). In 1993 one of the patriarchs of American political science Kenneth Walts wrote that the multipolar world was very stable but at the same time, unfortunately, too prone to war7.
This reasoning has one evident flaw. The authors are somehow reluctant to analyze the distinctions of the “classic” multipolarity from the one which is currently emerging, thus limiting themselves to a simple and spectacular, but quite superficial comparison of the two systems.
The ‘Bismark system” in Europe had a number of specific features, which, in my opinion, are entirely different from the currently emerging multipolarity. First, it was a closed-off and elitist system as it was restricted to a number of developed countries of Europe, the United States and Japan. Second, it existed in the environment when the war, according to the then effective international law, was still recognized as a legitimate instrument of settling international disputes and conflicts. It is equally important that the “classic system” existed without a powerful deterrent. After the Second World War the role of such deterrent came to be played by nuclear weapons. However, precisely the nuclear arms in many ways prevented the “cold war” from turning into a “hot war”, and allowed mankind to survive despite an abundance of crises (two Berlin, one Korean, Suez, Caribbean etc.), which by far exceeded the Saraevo crisis in their conflict potential.
Finally, the most important aspect. The “Bismark system” incorporated different countries with varying state systems and sometimes completely opposying state interests. However, they all (save Japan) belonged to the same Western Christian civilization and, competing or feuding with each other, as a rule, acted as a united front in their relations with the shapeless, inadequately shaped or obviously weak in the state-legal, economic and military-political aspects “non-Western” civilizations – China, India, African and Latin American countries. Today, when we talk about a “multipolar world”, before all, we imply an emerging inter-civilization communication not so much of individual countries but of the whole regions or, in a broader sense, communication of different races, cultures and models of socio-economic development. This paradigm is entirely different from the multipolarity of the early 20th century.
The emerging multipolarity includes both additional opportunities of cooperation and new, still barely known loads and risks, as the notion of “inter-civilization communication” also presupposed the “new generation” crises and conflicts. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2008 stresses that for the first time in the current history the global competition acquires a civilization dimension, which implies competition between different value reference points and development patterns within the framework of universal principles of democracy and market economy8. As to the latter, there are possible value, cultural and other nuances, which were identified by the international practice of the last twenty years. In particular, the global economic crisis demonstrated the futility of discussions on “universal principles of market economy” in the countries which tried to make those principles unconditional for all and everyone on the planet.
In this respect one can remember an interesting theory of “pluralist unipolarity” proposed by Alexey Bogaturov in the early 1990s. He spoke of the “change of nature”, “measured pluralism” of the unipolar US leadership in the world, treating the US not as the sole leader, but the one in a “tight circle of countries of G7”9, i.e. in fact, as a leader of a unified Western civilization10.” It allowed the author to presume that the unipolarity of the “moderated type” would be less harsh in its impact on the outer world than a hegemony of one state, the US.
Upon September 11, 2001 and in its aftermath the discussions on inter-civilization interaction took on the spirit of gloom prophesy. It seemed that the prognostication of Samuel P.Huntington on the “clash of civilizations” began to come true. More sophisticated public became fully aware of the connection between globalization as an eradication of information and cultural distinctions among different human communities and a protest of “traditional” societies, for example, Muslims or American Indians against the imposed alien behavioral stereotypes11. A legitimate question is whether mankind pins too much hope on the concept of multipolarity with no guarantees that a new multipolarity of the 21st century would not be any worse than all those systems experienced by the humanity in its relatively recent history – “classic” multipolarity, bipolarity, “underdeveloped” (or “pluralist”) unipolarity? Before answering the question, one has to take a closer look at all the aforementioned systems versus each other.
2
In the first decade of the new century one could notice a burst of nostalgia for the times of bipolarity, long ago sunk into oblivion, which was branded “the long peace” by J.L. Gaddis who actually coined the term. The most demanded authors became those who warned the world as early as at the peak of euphoria of the “end of history” against difficult ramifications of the destruction of the global world order established after 1945. For instance, just remember the statement of professor J.Meersheimer made in 1990 that one beautiful day we shall regret the lost order which, thanks to the “cold war”, replaced chaos in international relations12.
He insisted that the bipolar system had a more peaceful character because its protagonists were only two major nations. Moreover, under the given system, as a rule, the great powers demand loyalty from smaller countries, which, in all probability, leads to the establishment of rigid allied structures. Hence, smaller states are protected not only from the attacks of an opposing country but also from one another. Consequently, a bipolar system has only one dyad (pair) that can generate a war. A multipolar system has a greater flexibility and incorporates a variety of such dyads. Therefore, with other factors being equal, the statistic probability of a war in a multipolar model is higher than in a bipolar system. It is generally accepted that in a multipolar world the armed conflicts involving smaller countries alone, or just one major state are not so devastating as a collision between two major states. However, smaller wars can always grow into major wars13.
The specifics of the bipolar confrontation of 1945–1991 were far more diversified than the rigid scheme suggested by J. Meersheimer in an attempt to explain it. For instance, one cannot disregard the fact that by the end of the “cold war” the world has practically turned into a tri-polar model, keeping in mind the global role of China which materialized in the multifaceted interaction within the USSR-USA-PRC triangular and an actual risk of a full-fledged war between the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, the “intra-system” wars (China-Vietnam, Ethiopian-Somali, British-Argentina) were not entirely ruled out. Besides, the “loyalty of smaller countries” was quite relative, bearing in mind that in a number of instances the behavior of East Germany, Cuba and Vietnam towards the USSR, or that of France and Israel towards the United States could be well viewed as “quasi-loyal”.
Emphasizing the merits of bipolarity in ensuring the “long peace”, J.L. Gaddis admitted that to a large extent the peace was a result of a mere coincidence. In his summary review of the results of the “cold war” he wrote that it could have been much worse, and everything could have been entirely different. He concluded that the “cold war” ended with the victory of the right side14.
The doctrine of the “rightness of the US victory” was immediately used by the part of US ruling elite who viewed “benevolent hegemonism” as the lesser evil as compared to the hegemony of the “club of the chosen” or to a bipolar balance of forces. Both Democrats and Republicans were engaged in the doctrine promotion campaign (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch. Krauthammer, R. Kagan, W. Kristol). Their views were comprehensively enough discussed in Russian and foreign literature15, so there is no need to dwell on the issue any longer. Probably, the most representative was the statement of Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State in the Democratic Administration of Bill Clinton, who substantiated the necessity of the US global leadership by a more strategic vision of the situation by the Americans16.
Practical results of “benevolent hegemonism” turned out to be so deplorable that even one of the renowned pillars of the neoconservative school of thought, R. Kagan, had to acknowledge in 2008 that today’s world looked more like the 19th century than the end of the 20th. He then added that those who thought it was good news had to remember that the 19th century had ended in a less positive result than the epoch of the “cold war”17. Evidently, the message of the past events is that while claiming the role of the leader of a unipolar world, the US was physically and morally unprepared to bear the burden of such leadership. As a result, the American model of “freedom-democracy” (which initially seemed to be universally acceptable) stumbled into incomprehension and rejection not only in the countries of different civilization systems than the US (Middle East, Latin America, Russia) but also in the countries where the model had been initially “doomed” to success (countries of the so-called “older Europe”).
3
In my opinion, the new emerging multipolarity cannot be anything but civilization multipolarity. One has to emphasize that the inter-civilization communication is already a reality of today’s world where different economic and financial institutions, non-government entities, religious, business, public associations and, finally, individuals maintain constant multifaceted and multilevel international contacts of all kinds as representatives of their civilization archetypes, both in their own capacity or alongside their respective state authorities.
Meanwhile, one has to agree that the development of international communication among civilization poles of the modern world at the macrolevel is supplemented by the polarization of values at the microlevel. It is confirmed by a different attitude of individuals of different civilization archetypes to the in-depth perception of the universal issues on the mankind agenda (terrorism, fight against poverty and social inequality, nuclear arms non-proliferation, ecology etc.). As a rule, there are no differences in the superficial (“statement”) perception of the problem per se. Consequently, the calls made at high international levels (the UN etc.) “to combat terrorism”, “to prevent proliferation of MDW”, “to eradicate social and economic inequality”, “to preserve environment” etc. often hang in midair. Many instruments devised to resolve global issues turn out to be “insipid”, because their authors either deliberately neglect their substance in order to keep up appearances (agreement of opinion) or because of a special approach to those issues. For instance, what is the actual value of such a document as the OAS Anti-Terrorism Convention of 2003 where international terrorism was branded as “evil”? However, it neither pinpointed the cause of “evil” nor identified those who could be classified as “wrongdoers”. For instance, how can one enforce the universal compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while the power politics pursued by the US suggest to the “threshold” countries that possession of nuclear arms is the only guarantee against outer interference into their internal affairs?
Against this backdrop the phenomenon of “targeting” gains special importance (under the principle of facilitation of civilization contact). Obviously, the absence of a distinctly pronounced center in one of the most influential and thriving civilizations of the modern world, i.e. Islamic, complicates the system of inter-civilization interaction, while it does not revoke the necessity to establish one. At the same time, over the recent years one could notice growing interaction along the lines of “kindred” civilizations, in particular, between Christian Orthodox (Russia) and Christian Catholic civilizations. It manifested itself in an original “discovery” of Latin America by Russia in 2005–2008, and to a less degree, in traditionally more constructive relations between Russia and Catholic countries of “older Europe” (France, Italy, Spain, partially Germany) than the relationship with the Anglo-Saxon world, for example.
Though Russia’s animation towards Latin America became “in many respects an unexpected breakthrough in Russian foreign policy”18, apart from the geopolitical grounds, it was based on a sufficiently deep moral, legal and civilization foundation. Isn’t it a paradox noticed by the MGIMO researchers, that in 2008-early 2009 the Russian foreign policy displayed a fairly high efficiency “especially where the available resources of influence are relatively modest”, primarily on the Latin American vector and inside the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China)19? Maybe, one should pose a more general question: probably, our understanding of the “resources of influence” is somewhat outdated, and needs adjustment? Talking about “influence” and international image of our country, people traditionally consider economic, political and, finally, military factors, forgetting that the emotional and psychological similarity of different nations and cultures, their general perceptions of justice, morals and law can yield an equally substantial “image effect”.
If there is an advantage of a multipolar world order over unipolar or bipolar systems, it is the prerequisite that it must be based on the law. Brute force does not need the law which is intended to check it with reason. The accuracy of this observation is obvious in the example of the unipolar world which lived up to the rules of the main player of the global system. It is also applicable to bipolarity where each of the two “equally responsible” entities seeks to get a “free hand” in its area of influence disrespecting any international law. As a rule, the latter is used not for the intended application, but to discredit the opponent’s position in the global war with the “zero sum game”. However, the interaction of several equal players of approximately comparable might and influence needs the law in order to ensure a reasonable modus vivendi. It is even more applicable to such sophisticated system as civilization multipolarity. Its functionality will directly depend on the attitude of the main players of the system to international law.
The experience of Russia’s interaction with the Anglo-Saxon nations confirms former and current substantial differences in value perception of such seemingly universal notions as “security”, “partnership”, “sovereignty”, “democracy”, “human rights”, “terrorism”. The same applies to the appreciation of the role of international law as a demiurge of the world politics, which is advocated by the Russian diplomacy both at the theoretical and practical levels in the context of multipolar strategy. After the 2008 events in the Caucasus Russia has become ever more focused on strengthening and perfecting legal fundamentals of international relations. The importance is being attached to streamlining active interaction with the participants of the global system whose attitude to international law can be at least qualified as respectful.
Apart from the geopolitical considerations, the Russian discovery of Latin America of the recent years was accounted for by the fact that the stance of Russia and the majority of Latin American states on the most urgent political issues of the world are either close, or coincide. This already trite expression has become commonplace in the political language also because Russia and Latin American states regard international law as a natural pillar of the multipolar world order. The basis of our rapprochement is shared legal understanding of such problems as formation of the multipolar world, consolidation of the UN prestige, establishment and support of the regional security systems, fight against international terrorism, “old” and “new” threats to international cooperation, elaboration of non-discriminatory conditions of international trade and many others.
Historically developed special attitude of Latin Americans to international law20 corresponds to the key imperatives of our times. It disallowed the Latin American approval of the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and bomb raids in Kosovo in 1999. The majority of the states refused to recognize the legitimacy of the US and its allies’ invasion in Iraq. The Latin American interpretation of such an urgent problem as international terrorism merits special attention. Two years before the 9/11 attack, the White Book of the National Defense of Chile stated that the “boom of Islamic fundamentalism” can be a ramification of the attempted and forced global cultivation of the consumption and cultural standards of one and only civilization, i.e. Western21. All countries of the region subscribe to the idea of the necessity to build a multipolar world, and are trying to implement the idea in their everyday policy.
* * *
Talking about civilizations as potential parties of the system of inter-civilization interaction, one has to avoid a simplistic approach. Many things look different in practice than in theory. In a more detailed assessment of the stance of the Russian Federation and leading Latin American countries one can trace a certain difference of approach. The political culture of Latin American countries, which continue to think about themselves in the context of the “poor” (and now more and more “rising”) South, is in contrast with the Russian culture which is traditionally used to perceive the world order through the prysm of interaction of the “developed North” triangle (US-EU-Japan). Russia is also actively trying to squeeze itself into this triangular framework (but not always welcome by our Western partners). This is the reason of certain nuances of Latin American position on the issues of UN reforming, G8 enlargement, revision of the WTO entry rules. However, keeping in mind that Russia is seeking to restructure the global and regional systems of political and economic security on the basis of international law provisions, evidently, certain seemingly inviolable stereotypes will have to be revised. In the environment of a global economic (and moral) crisis at stake is the choice of preferential partners in ensuring a long-term strategy of development. One has to answer a question traditionally difficult for Russia: which party it is siding with: the ascending East (where today one can attribute Latin America through many value, cultural and ethical indicators), or with the West featuring the signs of the “descending” development?
Notes
1 We tend to agree with the opinion of A.D.Bogaturov that the unipolar world existed for about a decade, since signing of the Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship in Washington in June 1992, till the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003. It coincides with the conclusion of the “Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of 2007 that the “myth of a unipolar world has finally collapsed in Iraq” (http:// www.mid.ru./brp_4.nsf/sps/690A2BAF968B1FA4). The first practical attempts to pursue the Russian “multipolar” foreign policy could be seen in the 1997 Latin American tour of the then Russian Foreign Minister Ye.M.Primakov when he signed a number of documents on “strategic partnership” with several leading countries of the region.
2 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow, June 28, 2000. // System History of International Relations of 1918-2003 / Edited by A.D.Bogaturov. Volume 4. Documents. Moscow. 2004. P. 538-539.
3 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008. (http://kremlin.ru/ text/docs/2008/07204108.shtml).
4 Ibid.
5 Shakleina T. “Order after Georgia” or “Order under Obama”? // International Processes. 2008. No. 3. P. 7.
6 Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. Features of Theory and Application Study of International Relations. Moscow. 2003. P. 284.
7 Waltz, K. The Emerging Structure of International Politics // International Security. Vol. 18. No. 2. 1993. P. 321.
8 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008.
9 Bogaturov A.D. Features of Theory… P. 168, 291
10 Ibid.
111 In this connection it would be interesting to refer to the White Book of the National Defense of Chile of 1998 (i.e. three years before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington!). In this document the “boom” of Islamic fundamentalism is directly attributed to the protest of traditional societies against the pressure of Western lifestyle and culture under globalism (Book of the National Defense of Chile. Ministerio de Defensa, 1998. P. 34).
12 Meersheimer J. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008. No. 6. P. 9.
13 Ibid. P.12.
14 Gaddis J.L. The Cold War. London. 2007. P. ix, 266.
15 See, e.g., Fucuyama F. After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads. London. 2006.
16 Fucuyama F. Op. cit. P. 194.
17 Keigan R. The Paradigm of 9/11. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008. No.6. P. 120.
18 The Potential of International Influence and the Efficiency of Russian Foreign Policy (2008-early 2009). Analytical Report. MGIMO (U) of MFA RF. Moscow. 2009. P. 92.
19 Ibid. P. 94.
20 One has to point out the Latin American lead in working out a large number of instruments, methods and means of the peaceful settlement of international disputes: from negotiations and “good offices” to shuttle diplomacy, mediation and arbitration, their contribution into consolidation of the universal principles of international law – equality, non-interference and territorial integrity. Latin American countries introduced the principle of diplomatic asylum into international practices, worked out a number of important innovations in the maritime law, pioneered the establishment of the first nuclear-free zone (1967). See further: Problems of Latin America and International Law. Two volumes (Moscow. 1995).
21 Book of the National Defense of Chile. Santiago de Chile. 1998. P. 34.
