Victor Kremenyuk

1

        The new world order developed in the 1990s had all the chances to be successful. It was free from hard confrontation based on ideology or great-power rivalry. It maintained a certain consensus as regards the goals of development and means for their accomplishment. It clearly traced a tendency that a group of major and influential countries like Russia, China, India and Brazil (BRIC) would become members of the group of developed nations. First, it promised better international security due to lower rivalry and competition, second, higher living standards in a vast and densely populated group of countries – indispensable players in reaching a necessary level of global prosperity, third, opportunity to resolve general global issues of mankind, including those of preservation of environment, socio-economic development, disarmament, eradication of hotbeds of international and domestic conflicts.
        Special importance is attached to the factor of greater similarity in strategic goals of the group of industrially developed nations and that of the transition countries, which have set the goals of greater well-being of their people, better relations with the US and its allies, rise of own international importance based on social and economic progress instead of arms or violence. Alongside a still dangerous and hardly predictable world of traditionalist or just backward countries, one can see a rising group of countries capable of consolidating the groundwork of an emerging, more fair and stable world order with their weight and resources.
        However, unresolved issues were still high on the agenda. For one, how far did the progress of transition countries match the true and basic interests of the group of developed nations? On the one hand, the heat of global contradiction between the rich and the poor goes down in proportion to their development, which satisfied the West as well as all other players, while on the other hand, in case of success the neophytes could be a challenge against the established system of relations and roles, which was no less threatening. Therefore, though in principle the developed world favorably regarded the ambitions of Russia, China, India and Brazil to undertake necessary reforms, to restructure economy, to achieve higher efficiency of production, at the same time it could not but feel discontent and anxiety.
        If the issues of economic and social progress were resolved, and they had achieved higher indicators of the GDP per capita, would the follow-up be their demand to revise the hierarchy of relations and the system of responsibilities prevalent in the world politics and economy? Substantial success in economic development of the countries the size of South Korea or Singapore is one thing: it affects the market conditions but does not tell on the principles of the existing mechanism of global decision-making. Spectacular success in economy and technological development achieved by major countries like Russia, China, India or Brazil is another matter.
        For one, China has good reasons to claim its participation in the G8 format. India and Brazil, after Japan and Germany, insist on the reform of the UN Security Council and on their status of permanent members. At the same time, developing countries, being completely aware of the importance of interdependence, are seeking to amplify their status in international relations and to play a greater role in the world political decision-making, which would inevitably entail recasting at the top echelons of the world hierarchy.
        This aspect gave birth to one of the first spheres of tension in the new structure of international relations. Before all, it was manifested in the desire of the developed nations (headed by the US) to slow down, somewhat, the process of assimilation of the developing countries into their associations and institutions. It is difficult to identify what aspect was the most significant, either the US and their allies' deliberate reluctance to speed up admission of new members to their organizations, or it was something else. Eventually, one has to acknowledge that Russia was admitted to the G8 format despite the fact that at the time it has not yet overcome its own economic crisis. The decision to incorporate Russia into the G8 group had purely political purposes: to make its attachment to the Western world even stronger and to make it share the responsibility for the state of world affairs.
        In a more general sense, it was believed that the incorporation of new members into existing institutions can destabilize their operation. One has to admit that the process of establishment of such entities as NATO, the European Union, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was not an easy procedure. The mechanism of decision-making, distribution of responsibility, guiding principles, and many other fundamentals were developed for decades. Therefore, admission of new countries with a different history, economy, ambitions and priorities might be even damaging.
        The policy of Western countries began to show signs of apprehension toward the developing nations, which caused a significant slowdown in the international integration processes. In their turn, transition countries, becoming aware of this turn in the policy of the developed world, began to ask tough questions about possible integration among themselves. “Horizontal” integration, i.e. the one with the identical countries, was less attractive than “vertical” integration, i.e. the one with the developed nations. The developing world needs investment, state-of-the-art technologies, and solvent markets. All that can be ensured by more developed countries, and not their own neighbors.
        However, ideas of horizontal integration were also attractive. In particular, we are talking about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was born to resolve specific issues of coordination of interests and policy of Russia and China with the political interests of Central Asian nations. Under the influence of the developed countries' policy aimed at slowing down the process of integration of the developing world into its institutions, the SCO began to play a more important role. Obviously, it is not a NATO analogue, but, at the very least, a serious mechanism to coordinate the interests of a vast group of Eurasian countries including Russia, China, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and which did not invite to participate a single Western country.
        Despite the fact that to a considerable degree the decisions of the developed and developing nations were made on momentary considerations, they often displayed a strategic component. When they were talking about the “upgrading” of a group of potentially strong developing countries with the population of three billion people, or one half of the world populace, it promised the establishment of the world order where the majority of the world population would be united by integration ties, common interests, common lifestyle and production setup. It would create an appropriate environment in the world politics which would consolidate both the dominant position of the developed world (so far it is maintained “thanks” to the military might), and the rise of the second echelon of the homotypic states of different civilization orientations fully sharing the Western viewpoints. In this event we would be talking about the creation of a more or less homogeneous world where the countries of traditionalist orientation or failed states would be the minority and would be forced to comply with the rules and standards of more advanced nations.
        However, the inhibition of integration of the developing nations into the existing structures of the developed world began to change this perspective. So far, we are not talking about the “North-South” confrontation, or the one between the developed and developing countries. In the meantime, it became obvious that two different subsystems of relations are being born which develop different viewpoints on the world political situation and different aspirations. The developed world headed by the US, come what may, wants to preserve the current status quo and its dominating position therein, while the developing world wants to play a more substantial role in the world decision-making, without waiting when social and economic progress makes them a member of the “lucky club”. The world financial crisis and establishment of the “twenty” format to overcome it completely prove this conclusion.
        In this environment, new tangles of contradictions started to appear in the world politics and international relations. The “troublemakers”, the countries contesting the current status quo, i.e. those willing to occupy a more noteworthy place in the world hierarchy come to an understanding that they would not be automatically admitted to the ranks of more advanced and potent countries, even if they succeed to overcome the current crisis. They will have to prove to the developed world that they have an inherent right to equal participation in world decision-making, and those on the pinnacle of the world pyramid will have to make room and accommodate them into their ranks. Otherwise, there would be a threat of a new global conflict but this time with the participation of major and potent countries of the “third world”.
        However, this eventuality has its own intricacy. Today the developing countries are no longer revolutionary par excellence. The revolutionary mindset typical of the “cold war” times, with the crushing defeat of the enemy (i.e. capitalism) on the agenda, is giving way to a more comprehensive and reasonable approach. No one, with the exception of North Korea and Cuba, means to smash capitalism. On the contrary, more peaceful and ideologically uninhibited views facilitated recognition of many positive and useful aspects therein, which can be and are actually helpful to poorer countries to resolve their problems related to the production growth, satisfaction of the basic needs of the people, building of contemporary infrastructure, development of adequate education system and modern health care. Therefore, revolutionary slogans of the early and mid-20th century were substituted by more pragmatic and peaceful calls “to learn from capitalism”. As it were, the times of the “global NEP (New Economic Policy)” have come, which, at the same time, incorporates an element of challenge to the existing system of international relations.
        In the field of international politics it means that none of the strong players has in mind to defeat the bloc of developed nations or even to seriously undermine its positions. On the contrary, in the policy of Russia, China, India and others one can clearly see their commitment to cooperate and reach interdependence. A vital unresolved issue is related to the terms of this cooperation, what relationship models can they develop and implement? This question becomes the key issue in the relations between the two groups. To a great extent its solution would determine the future of the current world order.
        Another issue of the same sphere is the question of who among the developing nations would be the first to overcome the gap and qualify for the entry into their ranks? It is no secret that Russia's admittance to the G8 group caused quite mixed feelings among its partners on the developing side. China's entry to the WTO causes no less jealousy in Moscow. More advanced nations do not conceal their reluctance to deal with a unified bloc of the developing world which would formulate its common objectives and would be a counterbalance to the NATO and European Union. The West benefits from dealing with individual countries and negotiating specific issues (for instance, matters of energy security with Russia), disallowing each of them concerted support of other developing nations in its bargaining with the West.
        Hence, the second critical issue of the modern world policy: the danger of rivalry among the developing countries, and their struggle for preferential relations with the developed nations. Keeping in mind their former frictions (USSR/Russia vs China, India vs China, India vs Pakistan etc,), it becomes evident that we are talking about a highly dangerous and alarming perspective. One has to identify and observe a sufficiently sharp edge: on the one hand, not to alienate the developing countries, but on the contrary, to maintain their hope for a favorable solution of the development and international status problems. On the other hand, one has to control their mutual jealousy and distrust, and to forestall that their competition, constructive for the world community in general, ends in a disaster in the form of another major war. In this respect much would depend on the United States.

2

        To a large extent, the issues of contemporary international relations are explained by an obscure and ambiguous position of the United States. Unquestionably, the US still remains the leader of a group of developed countries: Western Europe, Japan, South Korea and a number of others. With those countries Washington has developed long-lasting and solid relations of partnership and cooperation, mutual assistance and trust. The United States play the role of their sponsor and protector, a kind of the model to follow, a leader in trade and finance. With the American assistance those countries have made great progress in their socio-economic development and construction of stable management institutions.
        Despite severe sporadic criticism of this subsystem of international relations in the times of the “cold war”, and even today, it not only stood the test of time but was also very productive and successful in creating a stable and solid element of international security and world economy. US allies do not fight each other and only rarely use force against other countries (the US tries to prevent such confrontations), and demonstrate spectacular results of economic growth and social justice.
        However, all that is not the limit of the US international role. After the “cold war” the US was the only superpower left with an enormous military might, nuclear arms, and military presence in practically all parts of the globe. The US is the leader of world economy accounting for more than 20% of the world GDP. The US dollar remains the reserve currency “number one” and the most welcome international tender. The US stays at the helm of several large international amalgamations: NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), a union with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS-Security Treaty), and have treaties of alliance with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Israel.
        In other words, the United States is justly the largest developed country with a vast influence all over the world. A logical question: what is the US attitude to the states which do not belong to their allies? In particular, we are interested in its attitude to the group of developing countries striving to overcome the gap separating them from more advanced countries, and in this sense would like to get support from the largest world power. Either the US is ready to assist therein, or, complying with the interests of its allies and with their own understanding of international solidarity, it will “regulate” this process prohibiting an independent solution of the backwardness problems to the transition countries.
        The United States gives a clear message that it is prepared to establish closer and more fruitful relations with the group of developing nations. However, it voices substantial reservations on “democracy” and “liberal reforms”. On the one hand, so far China is the only country which managed to develop an effective economy without establishing democratic institutions. On the other hand, an impudent US demand of immediate democratization is often in conflict with the specifics of historic and political development of those countries, primarily Russia. The above is and will be a serious source of tension in the relations with the US.
        What must be done, keeping in mind that today's imperatives (overcoming of backwardness, creation of adequate food economy, development of modern infrastructure, eradication of unemployment etc.) are disconnected from the radiant future of democracy by century-old stratifications of slavery, dependence, fear and unfreedom? How can one overcome this heritage without provoking a rise of anarchy, separatism, usurpation of central and local power by criminal groups? There is no simple answer to that question. The only possible way is a very prudent and slow progress, at least until the power in a transition country belongs to the old elite formed under dictatorship. Specifically this aspect of political life in transition countries causes real irritation in the US. They fear that under the guise of “modernization” slogans the old elite stays in power in those countries, which misuses the results of economic development to enhance their military potential and to prepare an attack on the international positions of the US and its allies. The apprehension is so strong that it hampers the development of closer US relations with such countries as India or Brazil, though they can be categorized as democratic nations.
        In 2001–2009, during George Bush Jr. administrations, the dominant convictions based on the doctrine of neo-conservatism were that the US is capable to manage the international system all by itself, and that the allies would not make much trouble as their proximity to the US guarantees security and an opportunity to focus on resolving the problems of economy and technological progress The transition countries did not cause much trouble as it was believed that in principle they had accepted the doctrine of the US “leading role” and were interested in establishing close and mutually beneficial relations therewith.
        After the September 11 tragedy the focus of US foreign policy attention was shifted toward the third and fourth groups of countries – the Muslim and failed states. It was followed by a brief and initially successful war in Afghanistan which led to the defeat of the Taliban regime, ensued by the war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq which also ended in the collapse of the former regime. With that, the time of success of the US foreign policy came to an end. It had to face difficulties caused both by the evident Washington miscalculations and by the hardly predictable or even totally unpredictable developments in those countries.
        A protest movement of radical groups has been gaining momentum in the countries finding themselves in between the Muslim world on the one hand, and failed states (for instance, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Sudan) on the other hand. They enjoyed substantial support from the more “peaceful” Muslim states, for example, assistance from the radicals of neighboring Pakistan to the Taliban. Their success was supported by such radical regimes as Iran. A failure of the Americans to win the battle in Iraq fostered an illusion of impossibility to defeat the radicals and, consequently, overestimation of their might. This is the conclusion made by the new US administration headed by Barack Obama.
        The United States “remembered” the transition countries. Their assistance was needed to settle such burning issues as Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iranian nuclear program, Afghanistan and radicalization if Pakistan. Serious trouble was looming ahead: the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, nuclear arms in Iran, joint operations of the radicals in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, nuclear arms in North Korea. A significant portion of anxiety was added by the President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez. Washington was coming to a comprehension that the world outside the group of their allied states was evolving in the direction entirely different from the one seen as acceptable to the US.
        It is appropriate to refer to the fourth report prepared by the US National Intelligence Council published in the end of 2008 – Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World – which offers the prognostication of the world development until 2025 made by the most seasoned American experts in international relations. In principle, they do not predict any major problems in the US-dominated parts of the world. If there is anything to upset peace and prosperity, most probably it might be some convulsion of nature like global warming. However, the transition countries can cause trouble as their development will be governed by the laws of unevenness of development. They can become either the source of serious destabilization (for instance, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan) or a base for a new group openly hostile to the West.
        While during the Bush presidency it was believed that the problems of the transition countries could wait, and the priority action had to be taken against extremism and terrorism in the countries of radical Islam and failed states, today the priorities seem to be changing.
        Election of the Democrat Barack Obama as the new American President can contribute to the restatement of the US foreign policy targets. First, the new US President is decisively enough prepared to revise the guidelines of US domination so typical of the Bush administration. He believes that, unquestionably, the US can and must play an active role in the policy of “stabilization” of the world system on the conditions acceptable to the allies and transition countries, while it has to be performed by the country seen as a recognized leader and architect, and not as a hegemon. Second, he deemed necessary to view the transition countries more as a reserve of the US global positions, than as a “challenge”, all the more as a “threat”. Third, he has set the task “to reset” the relations with Russia, China and other major developing countries.
        To all appearance, under the new administration the US intends to undertake an in-depth restructuring of its system of external ties and interests. The upkeep of relations with the allied states remains an unconditional priority, while the policy of enlargement of the American system of treaties can be reviewed. In particular, the new administration makes it clear that the membership of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO is a long way off, despite the fact that it is still on the American agenda. In order to promote more fruitful relations with Russia Washington is prepared to revise the rate of its rapprochement with those countries. A slowdown in the process of deployment of the American antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system in Europe is also feasible, as part of American concessions to Russia.
        One should not overestimate the significance of those Washington moves, while undoubtedly they were prompted by the intention to widen cooperation with Russia. This decision displays a more reasonable and prudent understanding that from time to time the Bush administration ignored crucial details of its decisions, which could be detrimental to the American interests. For instance, prodding the Ukrainian President V.Yushchenko toward a hasty entry to NATO (keeping in mind that the majority of the population disapproves of the idea) might have triggered a severe political crisis in Ukraine fraught with the schism in the country identical to the Yugoslavian scenario. A major crisis may have developed in Eastern part of the continent where Europe would inevitably collide with Russia which has its own interests in Ukraine (if only transit pipelines used to supply Russian energy resources to Europe).
        Georgia's hasty admission to NATO would have been not a less important danger to the US allies, as until the fall of 2008 Georgia was facing two unresolved conflicts in its territory caused by the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Awkward behavior of President Saakashvili in those conflicts resulted in a military confrontation with Russia, which generated understanding how close the process of the NATO expansion brought the bloc to the brink of a potential war with Russia. All the above demanded reconsideration and, at a minimum, a slowdown of the process, so that the expansion of the number of US allies does not create a risk of a major war.
        The Obama administration came to understand that it needs an urgent revision of its relations with such countries as Russia and China. In practice it meant a need to adjust even deeper fundamentals of the American foreign policy.

3

        There is no shortage in various prognostications related to the world economic crisis. One of the assessments deserves special attention – the one made by the distinguished Russian political scientist L. Shevtsova: she believes that as the result of the crisis the international system may be headed by three leaders: the US, European Union and China. It seems that those three entities would be able if not to avoid the most devastating ramifications of the crisis, then at least to use them to their own benefit, hence, to find themselves on top of the updated “pyramid” of the world structure. It is too early to measure the accuracy and correctness of this forecast, but one has to point out that in its own way it delineates a feasible new contingency.
        The US is ahead of other nations not only in terms of the damage done by the crisis but also in terms of the volume and nature of the crisis management measures. The American ruling class has enough forces and means to avoid panic in connection with potential hardships, on the contrary, to concentrate all necessary resources and to ensure their purposeful application in order to restore a regular beat of economy. Practically the same is true about the European Union. Brussels enjoys both a sizeable reserve of the second largest world economy, and a strong will which can get it out of the current plight.
        And China shows something entirely unusual. The Chinese leaders managed to accumulate a huge reserve of hard currency close to $2 trillion and are making vigorous efforts to walk out of the crisis with a profit. It appears that the world financial crisis may become a Chinese springboard which will help it to leave the category of the developing countries and to join the category of the advanced nations overnight, or, not to beat the gun, it can become the first global leader among the developing nations. It substantially amends the alignment of forces in the global dimension and Chinese relations with other countries, both advanced and developing.
        Obviously, developed countries will have to put up with the fact and, perhaps, to bless their stars that only China made such a breakthrough in development so far. It can have different consequences to other BRIC countries. Much like other major states, the developing countries directly benefited from the end of the “cold war”. They managed to take advantage of the renunciation of confrontation in the international arena and reallocated their resources in favor of the plans of socio-economic development, as well as for deeper integration of their economies with the economies of more advanced nations and the world economy in general.
        Some time ago practitioners and theorists started talking about a new phenomenon – the growing importance of the group of transition countries to the world future. The traditional model of human society development on Earth was that the enclaves of advanced civilizations appeared in certain parts of the globe, where the progress of human society was born, while the rest of the living space was filled with boundless backwardness and barbarism. Therefore, the proportion of people living in a civilized environment as compared to the number of those living in barbarism was always in favor of the latter. They were superior in absolute terms, and they had nothing to lose in a confrontation with the civilization. In a certain sense the history of mankind was an endless train of armed struggle of barbarians with civilization, which, as a rule, ended with the victory of the barbarians who themselves became civilized nations thereafter.
        In today's world the numerical superiority belongs to the nations living in poor and backward countries. On the one side there is the “golden billion” living in developed and rich countries, on the other side – about six billion people longing to keep up with them but yet living in poverty and backwardness. The process of reforms in economic and political relations in such large countries as Russia, China, India and others can change the ratio between the people living in poverty and those living in affluence in favor of more developed countries. If the rich countries learn to live in peace with their neighbors, it can radically change the march of human history and put an end to armed conflicts.
        From the US viewpoint, if the reform in transitory-type countries succeeds, it can initiate a new climate in international relations and world policy. The US foreign policy would be able to reduce its reliance on violence and to condense the military angle to the fight against terrorism, production and trafficking of drugs, and other criminal threats. Establishment of a new world order could become the top priority, where advanced and developing nations could unite their efforts as integrated elements of the global system.
        If the US succeeds in facilitating the construction of a new world order, one can expect a positive shift in establishing universal values and political institutes based thereon. Then, we can talk about establishing a new global system where the US plays a leading, and not dominating, role.
        In their turn, Russia and China pursue their own interests in the changing world order. Both enjoy a considerable potential of influence which has to be kept in mind. Together with the US, Russia remains to be a nuclear superpower able to annihilate its enemies within a short time, as well as to play an important role in the advancement of nuclear technologies, containment of nuclear arms proliferation and transfer of fissile materials. Russia has also become one of the energy superpowers controlling extraction and processing of energy primary products (crude oil and natural gas), their marketing and transportation. China remains to be an economic and demographic superpower with the largest population in the world and the largest world gold and hard currency reserves. Both China and Russia are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Cooperation in the bilateral mode and the SCO framework ensures stability in Eurasia. Both countries have an exceptionally large influence in the alien (civilization-wise) space – in the Muslim world, Hindustan, Africa and even Latin America.
        However, Russia and China are by no means allies (like it used to be in the 1950s), and are not so keen on that. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they share the UN values and principles, coordinate their policy on most crucial issues (for one, counterterrorism), and effectively cooperate in the fields of security and economic interaction. Evidently, both countries are still important competitors to one another and many other countries. They desperately need state-of-the-art technologies, markets and credits. Every billion US dollars invested into the Chinese economy from abroad is viewed as a debit in Russia, and every billion invested in Russia is seen as a loss in China.
        It is quite understandable, as both came onto the international field independently, without seeking advice from each other. They were pushed to the field of reform and accelerated development by mere understanding that virtually despite their impressive military potential they lag behind the technical progress and economic growth of more advanced nations, which makes their positions vulnerable. They are trying to resolve an age-old problem – to keep abreast with more developed nations. While during the “cold war” times it implied parity in the military potential, the end of the bipolar opposition convinced that the task of keeping abreast in socio-economic sphere is far more significant for self-preservation and survival.
        Each of the two countries has a dual system of interests and targets in this sphere. On the one hand, it is their ambition to modernize economy and infrastructure, health care and education in order to make them competitive. On the other hand, to break away from the dependence on more developed countries, to seek self-sufficiency and the right to participate in world decision-making. From this viewpoint they can be both, helpful or obstructive to each other.
        This is not an easy situation. Initially, right after the “cold war”, the solution of national development issues of the transition countries seemed to be monolinear: to work out an adequate strategy of development, present it to the governments of advanced countries, secure necessary trust and credits, and to use them in the proper way. However, it turned out to be quite a difficult task. Elaboration of the development strategy was hindered by the internal struggle of the elite in respective countries. Quite often the borrowed funds fostered greater corruption instead of problem solving. Meanwhile, foreign lenders were seeking guarantees and security of their capital by means of greater transparency and openness of the developing countries.
        Therefore, one of the main tasks of the Russian and Chinese foreign policy was to ensure an independent financial basis. As to Russia, it was achieved by saving a part of the proceeds from the export of energy materials. China accomplished the task through higher labor efficiency and by ensuring stronger positions in foreign markets. Their efforts began to pay off in foreign policy matters. Russia has substantially consolidated its ties with Western Europe, especially with Germany, France, Italy and Spain, China – with the US and Japan. The more spectacular progress they made in resolving their domestic problems, the greater concern was expressed by the United States.
        In particular, it became apparent in Russia's case when it reached the position of the sole supplier of energy resources to the European Union providing for 30-40% of required oil and gas to its members. The attained position and higher export revenues turned Russia into one of the main consumers of European products: motor vehicles and equipment, electronics, medicinal drugs, clothes and footwear, and, finally, foodstuffs. Quite an important element of economic interdependence between Russia and European countries came into being, which began to acquire a visible effect on the EU members' attitude toward Russia. Self-restraint of the Europeans during the war between Russia and Georgia and the “gas conflict” between Russia and Ukraine in 2008-2009 was an unpleasant surprise to the United States. The Europeans refused to support harsh and even hostile moves of the US.
        The US can expect something identical from China which became the second largest holder of American currency after the issuer itself, which forces Washington to be especially cautious vis-?-vis Beijing at the time of financial crisis.
        The United States were no less perplexed when, for example, together with consolidating its ties with Western Europe, Russia activated its “eastern vector” – its policy toward Central Asia, Iran and, primarily, China. Frequent visits of Russian leaders to Beijing and Chinese leaders to Russia, establishment of joint production ventures based on the Chinese investments, expansion of military and technical cooperation – to a certain extent, all that galvanized old American fears of the 1950ies when Moscow and Beijing were the closest allies in their struggle against “imperialism”.
        Today the prospects of convergence of the Chinese industry with Russian resources, supported by the factors of Russian nuclear and space potential, are not a source of great enthusiasm in Washington. The Americans actually doubt the possibility of a revival of the “Russian-Chinese union”, but cannot but understand that if they fail to revise the policy of squeezing Russia out of Europe pursued by the former administration, to review the strategy of establishing the third positional rayon of ABM defense with due regard to the legitimate Russian interests, and to give up an unfriendly policy toward our country, Russia can significantly intensify its drift both towards Europe and China, and can make the US confront the fait accompli of a new world order set up after the end of the “cold war”.

* * *

        The overall evolution of the system of international relations over the last twenty years turned out to be rich in content and not at all predictable. Undoubtedly, a whole number of developed and developing countries benefited from the evolution which allowed the consoliding sphere of socio-economic relations, political institutions, and to enhance the living standards of their nations. It is an indisputable success. At the same time, while accomplishing those tasks, the developing countries had to face a partial revision of the existing setup in order to make it more appropriate to their growing importance and legitimate interests. It already created a certain tangle of contradictions, and can still become the source of new conflicts, while it can become a sphere of cooperation and dialog between two groups of countries – advanced and developing.
        At the same time, the progress in both groups was accompanied by a substantial rise of tension in other two categories of the countries – traditionalist (Islamic) and failed states. Radical processes became a widely-spread phenomenon in the first group, which entailed, firstly, a greater terrorist threat, secondly, a greater risk of proliferation of weapons mass destruction, thirdly, a larger threat of the use of MDW in terrorist attacks against developed countries. There was a demonstrative division of the world system into constructive and destructive parts which, in the aggregate, can become a determining factor for the world process and world order. In the long run, the process can facilitate even a more extensive restructuring of the system of international relations where a decisive role will be played by the stance and moves of the US, Russia and China, alongside with the actions and standpoints of the US allies on the one side, and other developing countries on the other. Feasibility of this scenario has already been proved by the current financial crisis.