It has become increasingly popular to explain the fundamental differences in the models of political governance and man-state relations in Eastern and Western societies by reference to the diverging characteristics of the natural and social environments in which these societies developed over the last several thousand years. While the Western (Mediterranean) world was ethnically and culturally fragmented and scarce in natural resources, the East (China) was essentially homogeneous and resource-abundant which allowed for extensive forms of economic activity. As a result, since Ancient Greece, the West has undergone much more social and economic change (such as wars, transformation of spiritual ideals and means of material production) than the East which essentially preserved the model of "intra-family" relations projected from the psychological level to that of economic activity political governance.
          Diversity in the West led to the atomization of individuals and necessitated formal economic and political institutions, such as private property, the system of political representation and division of political authority into three branches. Christian faith became widespread in the West as a way to compensate for the destruction of kinship values and psychological comfort. Christianity subsequently became a major intellectual source of conflict between the collective and private domains (socialism vs. liberalism) in the West.
          Political and economic change in the West was promoted by the power of reason while in the East rationality was trumped by tradition and order. As a result, formal political institutions of the Western state became effective means of socio-economic management while in the East they only played a role secondary to the wisdom of tradition and imperative of continuity.

Russian Model of Democracy and Contemporary Global Governance

         By mid-2000s, globalization as a major international trend has not brought about increased homogenization, but reaffirmed the segregation of the world into multiple segments. Each segment comprises a broad social group (e.g. a country, a group of states or a whole region) which is characterized by a specific historical and cultural tradition. This tradition in most cases defines the mode of political governance and patterns of socio-economic interaction typical of a given social group. As an implication, democracy emerges as a host of forms of political organization rather than a single canonical form of internal governance developed by the West. The Russian "way of democracy" is built on a compromise between the classical principles of democratic rule, on one hand, and peculiar perceptions of justice typical of the Russian intellectual tradition, on the other.
          Over the past fifteen years, Russia has achieved significant progress in developing stable partnership with the West through a number of formal (such as G8 or the Council of Europe) and informal, or ad hoc (such as the "anti-terrorist front") coalitions. However, so far, Russia has not demonstrated enough creativity and willpower in promoting new designs of global governance that has not been adequately reformed since the break-up of the cold war order. At the level of its own foreign policy, Russia needs to further elaborate the concept and tools of "energy diplomacy" – the main source of the country’s influence on world politics.

Russia’s "Bitter Love" for America

         The ideal foundations of Russian and American states – the Russian Idea and American Dream – have been marked by essential divergence over the whole two-centuries history of bilateral relations. While America emphasized the "protestant spirit", individualism and particularism, Russia promoted solidarity, state-centrism and Orthodoxy. Both "projects" were characterized by messianic pathos and often found themselves on colliding courses. This, however, hardly impeded Russian-American cooperation in the international arena in the 19th and early 20th centuries and, subsequently, mutual respect during the cold war.
          Yet as the cold war was coming to an end, the image of America in Russia deteriorated significantly due to a number of factors. The failed attempt to transplant (supposedly) American political and economic institutions to Russia in the early 1990s led to a major disappointment with all that America could offer Russia by way of values, institutions, practices and expertise. American values and ideals started to be taken for what Russia had to face as a result of inept reforms. In addition, Russia had to accept the "younger brother" status as a new reality in relations with the U.S. and listen to the lecturing by American officials on purportedly universal political values and norms of international conduct. Russia’s reaction to the increased American unilateralism and reliance on military force was also hardly original. More specifically, the assertion of U.S. influence in Russia’s neighboring regions over the past decade was eyed by Moscow with anxiety and suspicion.
          Overall few ordinary Russians feel that America has done any good to them lately, while high-quality American studies are getting out of fashion among experts. A possible way to narrow the gap in mutual perceptions would be to achieve a decent level of stability and transparency in Russia (even in the absence of a sound democracy) and to do away with American disregard to others’ interests and attempts to impose American values in the outside world.

Islam as a Unified Actor in World Politics?

         The "Muslim World" in today’s international relations can be conceptualized in three different ways. First, it may be viewed as a unitary actor embracing countries with predominantly Muslim population and transnational players, such as international organizations of Muslim states, national Muslim institutions and communities. This approach presupposes the existence of at least one unified competitor of the Islam World, such as the "West". Second, the Muslim world can be regarded as a set of states and international grouping which often compete with each other for material resources, ideological prestige and other forms of influence. Finally, Islam can be perceived as a transnational community which collectively plays a distinct role in world politics irrespectively of state borders and formal international arrangements whose goals have little to do with the promoting Islam. Powerful transnational actors bearing Islam ideals include the Hizb-ut-Tahrir party, fighting for a world-wide Caliphate, and the terrorist network of al-Quaeda.
          There are serious reasons to believe in the notion that the Muslim world tends to reject modernity. Modernity was transplanted to this world by the West and took the form of subjugation, dependence (rather than freedom of choice and independence) and imitation (instead of innovation). In its extreme form, this rejection became manifest in the fundamentalist movement.
          The image of Islam as a unitary actor is boosted by neo-conservatism that gained momentum in the United States by informing the Bush Administration’s worldview. In this worldview, Islam was framed as the major enemy of the West in general and the United States in particular.

Crisis of Rational Universalism

         Long before the notion of the "West" acquired political connotation, its geographical meaning had defined some of its cultural and mental characteristics. Both West Europeans and their eastern neighbors perceived Western Europe as the ultimate "edge of twilight" – nothing but the ocean remained in the sun after it at the Western end of Europe. As long as the direction of twilight (as opposed to that of the dawn) had a psychological meaning of "Darkness" or "Evil", West Europeans may have particularly motivated to prove the existence of lands across the ocean.
          Before World War II, the West used to be divided and did not have the sense of unity and purpose it acquired after 1945 under the leadership of the United States. The commonality of security interests was reinforced by interdependence between Europe and North America and by economic integration within Europe. However, at the peak of Gorbachev’s perestroika, it was unthinkable that the Soviet communists could reinvent themselves as moderate social democrats. This could have spread the "social democratic model" (with its inclination towards sustainable development) across the vast space from Spain in the west to China in the east. This opportunity was destroyed by the right-wing conservative forces which dominated the political arena in G7 countries at the end of 1980s.
          Almost as soon as the dichotomy between Soviet Communism and Western Capitalism was transcended, a new one emerged between the latter and the "real East" comprised of two major, albeit disunited, parts – China and the Muslim world. Rationalism, which elevated the West above other civilizations, by the end of the 20th century spilt over to non-Western societies, and at the same time, reached the neo-conservative impasse in the West. To overcome this impasse and reduce tensions with the non-Western world, the West needs to relax its aspirations to a "mega-order" it seeks to build on Judeo-Christian values.

Illiberal Democracy and Political Effectiveness

         The existence of political regimes conforming to the formal criteria of democracy but failing to implement the essential democratic procedures has been recently acknowledged by political scientists in the West. In order to account for such regimes, these scholar introduced the notion of "illiberal democracy". On the practical side, a number of states can take comfort in calling themselves democratic yet conscious of national peculiarities. However, if one were to study the linkage between political organization and economic well-being, the question that should be addressed frankly is whether illiberal democracy is conducive to effective economic management and reform.
          Specific case studies as well as theoretical reflections suggest that only "essentially democratic" regimes ensure that the socio-economic system is sufficiently robust to sustain the pressures and alleviate tensions caused by consistent economic reform. Conversely, as shown by historical experience, "real democracy" is only likely to develop in specific socio-economic conditions (most typical of the West in the age of industrialization) and is strongly path-dependent. The emergence of an independently-minded and politically aware middle class is a sine qua non for a successful transition to "real democracy". Among other factors, such class can be promoted by a focused effort of state bureaucracies provided they are enlightened, goal-oriented and only minimally corrupt.

The Notion of State Identity in Contemporary
Theoretical Discourse

Organizational Forms of the Global Jihad

Status Quo versus World Order?

NETWORKING

Forum strengthens the academic community

Forum’s 2006 Winter School of International Relations

PERSONA GRATA

Images and Personalities

Between Politics and Academia

Debating current trends

Balancing the "Aliyev Orientation"

The Azerbaijani Phenomenon

SCRIPTA MANENT

Reviews

International Order: A View from Moscow
Баталов Э.Я. О философии международных отношений. М.: Научно-образовательный форум по международным отношениям, 2005. 128 с.
Баталов Э.Я. Мировое развитие и мировой порядок. Анализ современных американских концепций. М.: РОССПЭН, 2005. 366 с.

The Three Myths of "American Grandeur"
Nancy Soderberg. The Superpower Myth. The Use and Misuse of American Might. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wily & Sons, Inc., 2005. 404 p.

The Internal Challenges to American Power
Stephen Walt. Taming American Power. The global response to U.S. primacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 317 p.

Catching the Opportunity
Richard N. Haass. The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. 243 p.

Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War
Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom / James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig (eds.). Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005. 292 p.

The Nuclear Factor in World Politics
Ядерное сдерживание и нераспространение / Под ред. А. Арбатова и В. Дворкина. М.: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005. 82 с.
Ядерное противостояние в Южной Азии / Под ред. А. Арбатова и Г. Чуфрина. М.: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005. 29 с.
Ядерное распространение в Северо-Восточной Азии / Под ред. А. Арбатова и В. Михеева. М.: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005. 35 с.
Угрозы режиму нераспространения ядерного оружия на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке / Под ред. А. Арбатова и В. Наумкина. М.: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005. 33 с.

The Belarus Paradox
Baltarusijos paradoksai. Istrigusi transformacija ir regioninis saugumas / Sudare G. Vitkus, V. Pugaсauskas. Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2004. 216 p.

In brevi

A POTENTIA AD ACTUM

New Doctorships

Contents and Summaries

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