By late 2006, the development of Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine has passed four stages. During the first phase, which began in 1931, the Jewish settlers in Palestine fought with Arabs and the British colonial administration to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Since its foundation in 1948, this state has never been recognized by five of the seven Arab countries which declared war on Israel. The first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 ushered in a second stage in the conflict. During that stage, until the third war of 1973, Israel scored a few major military victories over Arabs and continued its territorial expansion. It was, however, constrained in the third phase under direct pressure on Israel by the US which ceased its almost unconditional support for Israel and established itself as a conflict mediator. Israel accepted the "land for peace" principle that has, nevertheless, been barely observed ever since by the Arab side. By the beginning of the current fourth stage in 1995, an agreement was reached whereby Palestinian Arabs could gradually build a state on one quarter of the territory of Palestine while Israel was to retain the remaining three quarters. After the upsurge in violence in the autumn of 2000, negotiation of any bilateral Israeli-Palestinian agreement became virtually impossible and Israel embarked on a unilateral plan of physical separation from the Palestinian territories. However, such plan, involving the construction of a 400-km wall between Israel and Gaza, will hardly guarantee Israeli security. The experience of warfare over the past millennia has demonstrated the inadequacy of "passive defense" – the strategy underlying the separation plan. Moreover, by erecting the wall, Israel is undermining its legal standing because some of the lands on the Israeli side of the wall have not been internationally recognized as part of Israel. The completion of the wall will significantly alter the conflict’s strategic environment and bring about a new stage in the intractable and bloody battle over Palestine.

The "Flickering" Conflicts of Self-Determination in Eastern Europe

         A thorough analysis of ethnopolitical conflicts in Eastern and Southern Europe as well as the Caucasus over the past two decades disproves the clash-of-civilizations-like concepts set forth in the 1990s. Such theories, for example, fail to explain the large number of cross-ethnic marriages and the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups within same villages in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1990. Neither can they account for the almost universal support for the independence of the Baltic states across all ethnic constituencies in these republics, including the Russians, in the late 1980s – early 1990s. Even if a conflict had an "ethnopolitical trigger", it can very soon enter a self-sustaining phase when it is fueled by a whole variety of socio-economic and often criminal factors. The world witnessed a dramatic rise in violent conflict in the decade after 1991. The main trend in responding to this threatening development was to extend the concept of peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peace building in the aftermath of a conflict. Peace-builders are however being criticized for favoring one particular party in the conflict and being inclined to support and legitimize a status-quo that was in place at the moment of intervention. There were no attempts to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet by means of peace enforcement accompanied by subsequent long-term peace building effort. Therefore most of these conflicts became "frozen" at some point in the 1990s. It was not until the middle of this decade that the new leaders of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova tried to "unfreeze" them and achieve a decisive victory over the separatists. As an important player, Russia has made a strategic choice to support the de-facto independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria while emphasizing the Kosovo solution as a precedent for these break-away regions. A heated dispute can be foreseen on this issue between Russian and the West which will go at great lengths arguing against parallels between Kosovo and the post-Soviet separatist conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe.

Pakistan – India: Confrontation Stability?

         Over the history of Pakistani-Indian relationship since 1947, both countries have gone through at least five rounds of warfare – almost once in each decade. The side that was making substantial investment in its military complex in the run-up to each rounds, would usually get the upper hand. A nuclear clash that could have resulted from the last round of hostilities some time in 2002–2003, was fortunately averted by a focused mediation effort undertaken by the US as well as the pressure from the international public opinion. The conflict is centered on the issues of Kashmir, water resources in the Indian-Pakistani border regions as well as on the fundamental problem of both sides’ self-identification. The conflict’s two main complicating factors are Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and China’s quasi-alliance with Pakistan. The conflict has been strongly influencing domestic politics and security in both countries and, on a few occasions, determined abrupt changes in national leaderships. By 2006, tension around Kashmir has somewhat eased while the squabble over the use of water resources for irrigation is becoming more acute. Pakistan is now on the brink of a major water deficiency crisis. In terms of self-identification, Pakistan feels much more vulnerable, both on the public and leadership levels, to a possible setback in the conflict with India. However, if India opts for a "global power" status, it will need to demonstrate flexibility and magnanimity in relations with its regional rival Pakistan. This could become easier if India’s economic performance and "attractiveness" as a political partner courted by major powers continues to improve. However, India will need to strike difficult compromises with China – the main opponent of India’s rising international clout.

The Relic and Potential Conflicts in Latin America

         The sense of common regional interests has always grown among Latin American countries in proportion to the feeling of weakness and vulnerability vis-_-vis the United States. Regional integration projects in South America have advanced and inter-state tensions somewhat abated after 2002– 2003. Argentino-Brazilian rivalry has receded as a major dividing factor in Latin America after Brazil dropped its aspirations to a privileged partnership with the United States and Argentina ceased to consider itself a country of "high European culture" with little civilizational connection to the rest of the region. This decade has witnessed Latin American region-building projects, bordering on full-fledged integration, motivated by geo-cultural and geo-economic imperatives. These projects included the deepening of Mercosur and the creation, in December 2004, of South American Community of Nations. An important motive force behind Latin American cooperation is the need to ensure energy security by developing transportation infrastructure for Venezuelan oil and Bolivian gas. While the Argentino-Brazilian rapprochement helped to settle a few conflicts in the La Plata sub-region, the two other parts of South America – the Andes and Amazonia – retain the potential for large-scale conflict. One major fault line lies between the US-backed Colombia and the Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela. Another populist leader – president Morales of Bolivia could stir up the old conflict with Chile over Bolivia’s claims for land access to the Pacific. In pursuit of the global anti-terrorist campaign, the United States almost gave up on its much-cherished project for a Free Trade Area of Americas. There is currently little willingness among South American countries to join FTAA through bilateral agreements with NAFTA. As a result, the US set on "pulling out" of single states from the Latin American integration groupings. At the same time, Washington will be increasingly relying on Brazil as a regional leader in mediating disputes, such as the one between the United States and the Chavez’ Venezuela.

Chronic Conflicts and the "China Factor" in Asia-Pacific

         Most contemporary conflicts in Asia-Pacific have low-intensity features – they are long-standing yet short of open confrontation that could lead to war. It has been suggested that the East-Asian sub-system of international relations is formally hierarchical (which distinguishes it from, for example, European politics). Therefore, the sources of conflict and stability in the whole sub-system can be traced to relationships among a few largest players. While economic interdependence has a mixed influence on stability, a very important role is played by historical memories and mutual perceptions that shape state identities and aspirations. The rise of China and the new US foreign policy after September 11th, 2001 have become the pivotal trends in the evolution of East Asian security environment. Although there is no comprehensive regional political and security institution, Asia-Pacific has been moved towards "partial instutionalization" through the consolidation of such blocs as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or ASEAN. The six-party talks, that have been so far addressing the North Korean nuclear problem, are now emerging as one of the most promising mechanisms of regional governance. Simultaneously, some of the "core" rules of the game in East Asia have been undergoing considerable change over the last decade. China’s Deng-Xiaoping-style "low-profile" foreign policy gives way to a strategy whereby Beijing acquiesces to American dominance yet tries to "dissolve" American-led security blocs in wider institutional arrangements. China is also actively propagating its values as a means of "soft" power which, according to the Chinese leaders, can help square the internally repressive political regime with increasing openness of China to the outside world. The tensions in the simmering conflict over the status of Taiwan have been somewhat reduced after 2000. This happened primarily because Washington has been abstaining from officially encouraging Taiwanese leadership to move towards independence while Beijing has held back from attempts to radically change the status-quo and Taiwan has adopted a prudent and flexible policy short of open confrontation with China. A much more complex North Korean problem has demonstrated that there can hardly be any solution apart from a multilateral compromise. The Russo-Japanese dispute over the four Kuril islands has been returned to its pre-1956 stage by a clear refusal of President Putin to consider the problem as such. However, Russian and Japanese positions converge on the whole range of other international issues which puts the major irritant in shadow.

Contemporary Conflicts in Africa

         Africa is the most conflict-ridden continent on the Earth. Since 1960, almost five million people died in African conflicts. After the collapse of bipolarity, many conflicts in Africa were started because at least one of the parties was convinced that the outside powers would never intervene to end hostilities. One factor contributing to Africa’s high conflict rate is the lack of effective means of warfare that could tilt the balance decisively towards one of the conflicting sides. Therefore, initiator of a conflict rarely runs the risk of complete destruction even in the worst scenario. Each conflict is driven by an array of military, socio-economic and psychological factors. In some conflicts, sub-regional leaders, such as Nigeria and South Africa, vie for power. Sometimes armed conflict is started by smaller states who "simply" want to test their power or cajole their neighbors, for example, into stopping uncontrolled migration flows from their territory. Unequal distribution of wealth, striking poverty, ineffectiveness of the state apparatus and wide availability of small arms all stimulate violence as a means to alleviate the socio-economic disaster. Inter-tribal and clannish animosities make the warring parties essentially intransigent and are commonly exploited by political leaders or warlords for their own purposes. Many of such leaders hail from military circles which makes it natural for them to try and resolve disputes by means of force. Native Africans also suffer from stereotyping they potential enemies and framing "others" in hostile terms. This makes the threshold of violence very low with fears and anxieties resulting in attempts to "preventively eliminate" putative threats. Among the whole range of contemporary African intra-state conflicts, the most violent and intractable have been those in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. US peacemaking efforts in Somalia failed while the DRC never saw UN peacekeepers arrive while the country is torn apart by local gangs and militias. Somewhat more successful have been peace building efforts in South Africa and Angola. Yet it was only in this decade that fighting ended in Angola while South Africa still suffers from an economic decline which resulted from the change of regime early in the 1990s.

Western Concepts of State Sovereignty

"Producing Intellect" for World Politics

Specifics of Russian Antiglobalism

PERSONA GRATA

Images and Personalities

Two Russian Schools in IR Theory in Russia

Debating current trends

Tajikistan in Regional Politics

The Southernmost and Most Important

SCRIPTA MANENT

Reviews

"Reflexive Liberalism" in the Theory of Conflict.
Andrew Williams. Liberalism and war: the victors and vanquished (The new international relations). New York, London: Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge, 2006. 263 p.

Between Prudence and Obsession
Warren I. Cohen. America’s Failing Empire: U.S. Foreign Relations since the Cold War. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 204 p.

War and Arms Control
Michael A. Levi, Michael E. O’Hanlon. The Future of Arms Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 191 p.
George Perkovich, Jessica T. Methews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Goetemoeller, Jon B. Wolfstall. Universal Compliance. A Strategy for Nuclear Security. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. 220 p.

Who Is the First to Break the Nuclear Taboo?
George H. Quester. Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 159 p.

The Bush’s Nuclear World
Nuclear Transformation. The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine / Edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 288 p.

Tempted by Power
Andrew Bacevich. The New American Militarism. How Americans are Seduced by War. Oxford, New-York: Oxford Universuty Press, 2005. xvi + 270 p.

In brevi

A POTENTIA AD ACTUM

New Doctorships

Contents and Summaries

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